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CHOICE

OF

LAW-CHANGE

IN

VENUE-FEDERAL

COURTS-The

United States Supreme Court held that a transferor forum's state
law applies after a change in venue is granted in accordance with
28 USC section 1404(a).
Ferens v Deere & Company, 494 US

-

, 110 S Ct 1274, 58

USLW 4333 (1990).
Albert J. Ferens (hereinafter, "Ferens") lost his hand on July 5,
1982, when it allegedly became caught in a combine manufactured
by John Deere & Company (hereinafter, "Deere").' Ferens was a
resident of Pennsylvania where the accident occurred and Deere
was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Illinois.
On July 3, 1985, Ferens filed a claim in United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, claiming breach of
warranty.' On July 25, 1985, Ferens filed a claim founded on the
same occurrence in United States District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi, 4 based on negligence and strict liability.'
Relying on Klaxon v Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 6 Ferens understood

that Mississippi's six-year tort statute of limitations would apply,7
, 110 S Ct 1274, 58 USLW (BNA) 4333
1. Ferens v Deere & Company, 494 US (1990). Deere had sold the combine to the Uniontown Farm Equipment Company, which
then sold the machine to Ferens for use on his farm. Ferens v Deere & Company, 639 F
Supp 1484, 1485 (W D Pa 1986).
2. Ferens, 110 S Ct 1277.
3. Ferens, 639 F Supp at 1485. The claim was based on the Pennsylvania Commercial
Code, 13 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 1101-9507 (Purdon 1984).
4. Ferens, 639 F Supp at 1485. Deere is registered to conduct business in Mississippi,
has a registered agent for service of process, and actually transacts some business there. Id
at 1492.
5. Id. Recovery was based on theories of negligence and strict liability under sections
402A and 402B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. Section 402A concerns special
liability of a seller of a product for physical harm to a user or consumer and section 402B
concerns misrepresentation by a seller of chattels to a consumer. Both sections are found
under the topic of strict liability. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 (1965).
6. 313 US 487 (1941). Klaxon held that in diversity of citizenship cases, the federal
courts must follow conflict of laws rules prevailing in the states in which they sit. Id at 496.
Ferens' position was that under Klaxon, Mississippi district courts sitting in diversity must
apply the choice of law rule of Mississippi state courts. Ferens v Deere & Company, 819 F2d
423, 425 (3d Cir 1987).
7. Ferens v Deere & Company, 862 F2d 31,' 34 (3d Cir 1988). Mississippi's Limitation
of Actions statute provides: "All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed
shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not
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but that Pennsylvania's substantive law would control the personal
injury claim." Ferens then filed a motion for change of venue under
28 USC section 1404(a), 9 to have the Mississippi negligence claim
transferred to the Western District of Pennsylvania. 0 Deere did
not oppose the motion and it was granted." The Pennsylvania District Court consolidated the two law suits for all purposes. 2
Deere filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations was a bar to Ferens'
negligence and strict liability claims.' 3 Based on the decision in
Van Dusen v Barrack,'4 Ferens believed that Mississippi's six-year
statute of limitations should apply. Ferens reasoned that the law of
the transferor forum applied following a transfer under section
1404(a).' 5 The court determined that Pennsylvania had the greater
interest in the case and held that the transferee forum's law applied.' 6 The court thus applied Pennsylvania's two-year statute of
7
limitations and granted Deere's motion for summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed on the
grounds that Mississippi's contacts with the litigants were so minimal that the application of Mississippi law would violate due proafter." Miss Code § 15-1-49 (1972).
8. Ferens, 110 S Ct at 1278.
9. Id Section 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice, a District Court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought." 28 USC § 1404(a) (1982).
10. Ferens, 110 S Ct at 1278. The request for transfer was premised on the theory that
Pennsylvania was a more convenient forum. Id.
11. Id. The Mississippi court accepted Ferens' arguments that he resided in Pennsylvania, that the accident occurred there, and that the claim had no connection to Mississippi
since witnesses, evidence and the pending warranty action all were in Pennsylvania. Id.
12. Id. Ferens' motion for transfer in the Mississippi court claimed that the breach of
warranty action pending in the Western District of Pennsylvania presented common questions of fact and law. Ferens, 819 F2d at 424-25.
13. Ferens, 639 F Supp 1484, 1485 (W D Pa 1986). Pennsylvania's limitation of time
provides in relevant part: "The following actions and proceedings must be commenced
within two years: (2) An action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death
of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of
another." 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5524(2) (Purdon 1982).
14. 376 US 612 (1964). Van Dusen held that the law of the transferor forum applies
following a defendant-initiated transfer. Id at 639. (The Van Dusen rule.) Van Dusen also
stated explicitly, "We do not attempt to determine whether, for example, the same considerations would govern if a plaintiff sought transfer under § 1404(a)." Id at 640 (emphasis
added).
15. Ferens, 110 S Ct at 1278.
16. Ferens, 639 F Supp at 1492.
17. Id. The court denied Deere's motion for summary judgment on the warranty claim.
Id at 1489.
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cess.' s The Mississippi contacts were determined to be so insignificant that the application of Mississippi law would be "arbitrary,
fundamentally unfair, and therefore unconstitutional.' ' 9
On Writ of Certiorari granted to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded2" the decision for reconsideration in light of their decision
in Sun Oil Co. v Wortman.2' On remand, the Third Circuit Court
held that its reasoning in the prior decision was inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's determination in Sun Oil Co. v Wortman.22
The Third Circuit then proceeded to address whether the transferor's or the transferee's state law should apply following a plaintiff-initiated transfer under section 1404(a). 3 Their previous decision was again affirmed holding that the state law of the transferee
24
forum applied.
On the second Writ of Certiorari granted to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 25 the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.2" In a 5-4 decision,27
the majority, led by Justice Kennedy, held that the law of the
transferor state should apply regardless of whether a section
1404(a) motion is initiated by plaintiff or defendant.2"
Justice Kennedy began the court's analysis by reviewing its
18. Ferens, 819 F2d at 427. The court did not consider whether the Van Dusen rule
applied. Id at 427, n.5. See note 14.
19. Id. See Allstate Insurance Co. v Hague, 449 US 302, 312-313 (1981). In Allstate,
plaintiff's husband was killed in an automobile accident in his home state of Wisconsin.
Plaintiff subsequently moved to Minnesota where her husband had been employed and filed
suit in Minnesota state court. The Supreme Court held that for a state's substantive law to
be selected, that state must have significant contacts such that choice of law is not unconstitutional. Id.
20. Ferens v Deere & Company, 108 S Ct 2862 (1988).
21. 108 S Ct 2117 (1988). Sun Oil Co. v Wortman was decided twelve days prior to the
Ferens' decision. In Sun Oil, plaintiffs sued in Kansas state court seeking interest on suspended royalty payments on gas extracted from properties in Texas, Louisiana, and
Oklahoma. The Kansas state court had applied its own statute of limitations to the claim
which in substance was governed by the laws of Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. The Supreme Court held that a forum state may apply its own statute of limitations to claims
governed by another state without violating the due process clause. Id at 2120-21.
22. Ferens, 862 F2d at 32.
23. Id. See note 9.
24. Id at 36.
25. Ferens v Deere & Company, 109 S Ct 2061 (1989).
26. Ferens, 110 S Ct at 1284.
27. Justice Scalia dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun. Id.
28. Id.
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holding in Van Dusen v Barrack.29 The Van Dusen decision was
based on the legislative history of section 1404(a) which showed
that Congress had enacted the statute because broad venue provisions in federal acts often resulted in inconvenient forums, and
that Congress had decided to respond to this problem by permitting transfer to a convenient federal court under section 1404(a). 30
The Van Dusen court held that following a defendant initiated
transfer under section 1404(a), the law of the transferor state
31
should apply.
Relying on a quoted portion of Van Dusen, the court advanced
three independent reasons to support the rule that the transferor's
law also applied following a plaintiff initiated transfer.32 First, sec33
tion 1404(a) should not deprive parties of state law advantages.
This policy has its foundation in Erie R. Co. v Tompkins.3 4 Apply29. 376 US 612 (1964). Ferens, 110 S Ct 1279. Van Dusen v Barrack will be discussed
in detail below.
30. Ferens, 110 S Ct at 1279. The Court quoted Van Dusen:
This legislative background supports the view that section 1404(a) was not designed
to narrow the plaintiff's venue privilege or to defeat the state-law advantages [one
advantage inherent in the federal system is that which gives a plaintiff multiple
venue choices based on diversity] that might accrue from the exercise of this venue
privilege but rather the provision was simply to counteract the inconveniences that
flowed from the venue statutes by permitting transfer to a convenient federal court.
The legislative history of section 1404(a)-certainly does not justify the rather startling
conclusion that one might 'get a change of a law as a bonus for a change of venue.'
Indeed, an interpretation accepting such a rule would go far to frustrate the remedial
purposes of section 1404(a). If a change in the law were in the offing, the parties
might well regard the section primarily as a forum-shopping instrument. And, more
importantly, courts would at least be reluctant to grant transfers, despite considerations of convenience, if to do so might conceivably prejudice the claim of a plaintiff
who initially selected a permissible forum. We believe, therefore, that both the history and purposes of section 1404(a) indicate that it should be regarded as a federal
judicial housekeeping measure, dealing with the placement of litigation in the federal
courts and generally intended, on the basis of convenience and fairness, simply to
authorize a change of courtrooms.
376 US at 634-36.
31. Ferens, 110 S Ct 1279. See note 14.
32. Id at 1280. See note 30.
33. Id. See note 30.
34. 304 US 64 (1938). Justice Kennedy quoted Guaranty Trust Co. v York, 326 US 99
(1945), which in his view explained Erie as follows:
In essence, the intent of [the Erie] decision was to insure that, in all cases where a
federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of
the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially
the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if
tried in a State court. The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v Tompkins is
that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a
federal court instead of in a State court a block away should not lead to a substantially different result.
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ing the transferor law would not deprive the plaintiff of any state
law advantages."8 A defendant also would lose no legal advantage if
the transferor law controls; the same law would have applied if the
plaintiff had not made the motion for transfer.3" A defendant may
lose a non legal advantage by whatever advantage inheres in forcing the plaintiffs to litigate in the original forum or not at all.3 7 But
this loss is slight as a plaintiff can always sue in a favorable court
and not seek a transfer. 8 The purpose of section 1404(a) is to eliminate inconvenience without altering plaintiffs' choices under the
venue statutes.3 9 Applying the transferee law however, would undermine Erie since a section 1404(a) transfer changes the state law
applicable to a diversity case.40 In general, section 1404(a) is a
housekeeping measure that should not alter the state law governing a case under Erie.4 1 The Mississippi statute of limitations,
which would have applied if Ferens had not moved for a transfer,
should continue to apply after a transfer.4 2
Further, the Court reasoned that applying the transferee law
would not discourage plaintiffs from suing.43 Ferens would have
continued to litigate the case in the District Court in Mississippi if
it were known that the District Court in Pennsylvania would dismiss the action. 4
The second reason advanced is-that section 1404(a) should not
create opportunities for forum shopping.4 5 Forum shopping opportunities exist whenever a plaintiff has a choice of forums that will
apply different laws.46 Section 1404(a) is required to be interpreted
so no opportunity is created for obtaining a more favorable law by
326 US 99, 109 (1945). [The holding of Guaranty Trust has generally become known as the
outcome determinative test.]
35. Ferens, 110 S Ct 1280.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id at 1281.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. See Van Dusen, 376 US at 636-37.
42. Ferens, 110 S Ct 1281.
43. Id.
44. Id. The Court also suggested that other plaintiffs would sue in an inconvenient
forum with the expectation that the defendants would seek transfer to a convenient forum,
resulting in application of the transferor law under Van Dusen. Id.
45. Id at 1282. See note 30. Discouragement of forum-shopping was one of the twin
aims of the Erie rule. The other aim was that of uniformity within a state. Hanna v Plumer,
380 US 460. 468 (1965).
46. Id.
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selecting a forum through a transfer of venue."7 Ferens could have
filed suit in any court which had diversity jurisdiction.4 8 Justice
Kennedy believed that applying the transferor law would not give
a plaintiff an opportunity to use a section 1404(a) transfer to obtain a law he could not have obtained through his initial forum
selection. 49 The forum shopping choice already existed.50
Further, applying the transferee law might create opportunities
for forum shopping indirectly. 5 To the extent plaintiff-initiated
transfers would be discouraged, it might give potential transferee
states incentives to enact similar laws [long statutes of limitations]
to attract out-of-state business that would not be moved under
section 1404(a) at the instance of the plaintiff.2
The third reason advanced by the Court was that a decision to
transfer venue under section 1404(a) should be based on considerations of convenience rather than the possibility of prejudice resulting from a change in the law. 3 If the law were to change following
a transfer initiated by a plaintiff, a district court would be reluctant to grant a transfer that would prejudice the defendant.5 4 Section 1404(a) is not only designed to benefit the moving party, but
also to benefit witnesses, the interest of justice, and the convenience of the court. 5 Litigation in an inconvenient forum does not
harm the plaintiff alone. 6
A fourth reason, not taken from Van Dusen, was then advanced
for the decision. Foresight and judicial economy favor the simple
rule that the law does not change following a transfer of venue
under section 1404(a).5 8 If the transferee law applied following a
section 1404(a) motion by a plaintiff, cases such as this would not
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id at 1282. See note 30.
54. Id.
55. Id at 1282-83.
56. Id at 1283. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v Gilbert, 330 US 501 (1947). In Gulf Oil,
plaintiff had filed suit in federal district court in New York. Both plaintiff and defendant
were Virginia residents and the occurrence took place in Virginia. The Court applied the
doctrine of forum non conveniens and dismissed the action. Id at 502-03. See note 82 for a
definition of forum non conveniens.
57. Ferens, 110 S Ct at 1283.
58. Id. The Court believed this case involved some considerations which perhaps were
not given sufficient consideration in Van Dusen. Id.
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arise.5 9 Plaintiffs in Ferens' position would not move for a change
of venue.60 The rule would leave unclear which law should apply
when both parties move for a transfer, or when the court transfers
on its own motion, or when only one of several plaintiffs request a
transfer, or when circumstances change through no fault of the
plaintiff, making a once convenient forum inconvenient.' Justice
Kennedy reasoned that there was a duty to consider whether the
decision would create litigation and uncertainty and believed that
these considerations were the basis for applying the transferor law
regardless of who made a section 1404(a) motion.2
The court concluded that no alternative rule would produce a
better result.6 3 To hold otherwise would mean that Ferens should
have continued to litigate the warranty action in Pennsylvania and
the tort action in Mississippi.64 Section 1404(a) was designed to
prevent a situation in which two cases involving the same issues
are simultaneously pending in different courts. To do otherwise is
a waste of time, energy, and money.6 5
The majority opinion rejected developing any federal choice of
law rules believing state conflict of law rules already ensured that
appropriate laws would be applied to diversity cases, and that the
law of the transferor forum effected the appropriate balance be66
tween fairness and simplicity.
Justice Scalia, in a dissent with whom three other justices joined,
compared the Van Dusen and Ferens decisions in two respects.6
First, it is unlikely that Congress, in enacting section 1404(a),
meant to provide the defendant a vehicle by which to manipulate
the substantive law to be applied in a diversity case. 8 It is therefore unlikely that Congress meant to provide the plaintiff with a
vehicle by which to appropriate the law of a forum in which he
does not intend to litigate, and carry it back to the state where he
wishes to try the case.6 9 Second, application of the transferor
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id at 1284.
64. Id.
65. Id. See Continental Grain Co. v Barge FBL-585, 364 US 19, 26 (1960) which held
that section 1404(a) was enacted to prevent a waste of resources.
66. Ferens, 110 S Ct 1274, 1284. See Note, 75 Yale L J at 130-35. See also, R. Leflar,
American Conflicts Law, § 143 at 293 (3d ed 1977).
67. Ferens, 110 S Ct at 1284.
68. Id at 1286.
69. Id.
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court's law would encourage forum shopping between state and
federal courts. 70 Here the plaintiffs sought the use of a Pennsylvania federal court instead of a Pennsylvania state court in order to
obtain application of a different substantive law.71 The judicial
policy expressed in Erie and Klaxon is reduced to a laughingstock
if it can so readily be evaded through filing and transfer.7 2
Assuming that the plaintiff went to the trouble of bringing suit
in a forum "where the law was less favorable to him," the dissent
disagreed that the defendant would be prejudiced by a transferinduced change in the law. 73 Also, now that filing and transfer is an
approved method of forum shopping, the number. of additional
suits that will be filed in inconvenient forums will increase systemic costs. In addition, transferee courts will need to figure out
the choice of law rules and the substantive law of distant states.7 '
The dissent concluded that the majority opinion was wrongly
premised on its interpretation of section 1404(a) and then asked
whether Klaxon stood in the way of the policies of that statute.75
The dissent believed the correct reasoning initially begins with the
Rules of Decision Act 7" and then asks whether section 1404(a) adheres to the Klaxon holding of uniformity within a state.77 This
approach, according to Justice Scalia, is preferable since the Rules
of Decision Act addresses the subject of which law to apply and
section 1404(a) does not.7"
The starting point for the Ferens Court's analysis was section
1404(a). 7 9 Section 1404(a) was proposed by Professor James W.
Moore who acted as a special consultant to the revision staff of the
judicial code. 0 His testimony regarding venue provided in relevant
part: "Venue provisions have not been altered by the revision . . .
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id at 1286 (emphasis in original).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 28 USC § 1652 (1982). The Rules of Decision Act provides: "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in
the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Id.
77. Ferens, 110 S Ct 1285.
78. Id.
79. Id at 1279.
80. James W. Moore, et al, 1A (Pt 2) Moore's Federal Practice 0.345 [4.-1] at 4333
(Bender, 2d ed 1989). Professor Moore's testimony should provide insight into interpretation of section 1404(a) as a result of his work drafting the section.
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and section 1404 introduces an element of convenience which gives
the court the power to transfer a case for the convenience of parties and witnesses to another district. . . ."'
Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, 82 permitting transfer to a more convenient
forum, even though venue is proper.8 3 Subsection (a) requires a
court to determine whether the transfer is necessary for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and, further, whether it is in
the interest of justice.8 '
Section 1404(a) says nothing about choice of law.85 From the enactment of section 1404(a) in 1948, until the Supreme Court's decision in Van Dusen in 1964, lower federal courts construing section
1404(a) were in conflict as to whether a transfer produced a change
in the applicable state law."6 In Van Dusen, the Supreme Court for
the first time dealt with the issue of whether a change of venue
within the federal system is accompanied by a change in law.8
The Van Dusen Court's analysis first focused on the language
and policy of section 1404(a) and held there was nothing to justify
its use by defendants to defeat the advantages accruing to plaintiffs who have chosen a forum which, although inconvenient, had
proper venue.8 8 The legislative background supports the view that
section 1404(a) was not designed to narrow the plaintiff's venue
privileges or to defeat the state law advantages, but rather was
simply to counteract the inconveniences that flowed from the
venue statutes by permitting transfer to a convenient federal
court. 9
The Van Dusen Court then based its decision on the desire to
81. Judiciary Act of 1948, Hearings on HR 1600 before Subcommittee No. 1, 80th
Cong, 1st Sess 27 (1947) (statement of James Moore).
82. The term forum non conveniens refers to the discretionary power of a court to
decline jurisdiction when convenience of parties and ends of justice would be better served
if action were brought and tried in another forum. Black's Law Dictionary 589 (West, 5th
ed 1979).
83. Special Pamphlet on PL-773, 80th Cong, 2d Sess US Code Congressional Service
1853 (1948).
84. Id.
85. Ferens, 110 S Ct 1279.
86. See Headrick v Atchison, T & Santa Fe R. Co., 182 F2d 305 (10th Cir 1950); HL
Green Co. Inc. v MacMahon, 312 F2d 650 (2nd Cir 1962) which applied the law of the
transferor forum. But see, McGee v Southern Pac. Co., 151 F Supp 338, 340 (S D NY 1957);
Reynolds v Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 185 F2d 27, 29 (7th Cir 1950), cert denied, 340 US 947
(1951), which applied the transferee forum law.
87. Van Dusen, 376 US at 625.
88. Id at 633-34.
89. Id at 635-36.
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prevent forum shopping.90 If a change of law occurred, the parties
might regard the section primarily as a forum shopping instrument. " Courts would be reluctant to grant transfers, despite considerations of convenience, if to do so might prejudice the claim of
a plaintiff who had initially selected a permissible forum.2 The
Court believed, therefore, that section 1404(a) should be regarded
as a federal judicial housekeeping measure, dealing with the placement of litigation in the federal courts and generally intended, on
the basis of convenience and fairness, simply to authorize a change
93
of courtrooms.
The Van Dusen Court believed its interpretation of section
1404(a) was in accord with the policy of Erie R. Co. v Tompkins.9 4
The "accident" of federal diversity jurisdiction should not enable a
party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court which
could not have been achieved in the courts of the state where the
action had been filed.9 5 The Court concluded that where the defendants seek transfer, the transferor law applies.9 However, the
Court did not attempt to determine whether the same considerations would govern if a plaintiff sought transfer under section
1404(a).
Lower courts have been divided over which law applies following
a plaintiff initiated transfer.98 Two decisions from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit are good examples of
the conflicting opinions in this area.
In Carson v U-Haul,99 the plaintiff sued for personal injuries in
federal district court in Georgia regarding an accident which occurred in Kentucky.'0 0 Plaintiff's motion to transfer the action to
90. Id at 636.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id at 636-37.
94. Cited in note 34.
95. Van Dusen, 376 US at 638 (emphasis added).
96. Id at 639. After Van Dusen, courts subsequently facing the question of choice of
law after a defendant-initiated transfer have uniformly followed Van Dusen, applying the
law of the transferor forum. Note, Choice of Law in Federal Court After Transfer of Venue,
63 Cornell L Rev 149, 153 (1977).
97. Van Dusen, 376 US at 639-40.
98. Note, 63 Cornell L Rev at 154 (cited in note 96). Compare Hargrove v Louisville
& N R.R., 153 F Supp 681, 684 (W D Ky 1957) and Schenk v Piper Aircraft Corp., 377 F
Supp 477, 480 (W D Pa 1974) (applyin the transferor law) with Les Schwimley Motors, Inc.
v Chrysler Motors Corp., 270 F Supp 418, 420-21 (E D Cal 1967) and Watwood v Barber, 70
FRD 1, 5 (N D Ga 1975) (applyin the law of the transferee forum).
99. Carson v U-Haul Co., 434 F2d 916 (6th Cir 1970).
100. Carson, 434 F2d at 917.
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Kentucky was granted. 10 1 The Kentucky district court held that
plaintiff's action was barred by Kentucky's statute of limitations.10 2 Plaintiff appealed the issue of which state's statute of limitations applied following a plaintiff-initiated transfer. 3 The appeals court affirmed, believing that since the transfer was at the
request of the plaintiff, Georgia was no longer the forum state.
Kentucky became the new forum state and its statute of limita04
tions controlled.1
Ten years later in Martin v Stokes, 05 the defendant in a personal injury action sought a transfer from federal district court in
Virginia to federal district court in Kentucky.106 The defendant's
oral motion was granted, but the order did not state whether the
transfer was made under 28 USC section 1404(a) or section
1406(a).0 7 The Kentucky court advanced that it did not matter
whether a plaintiff or defendant sought a transfer under section
1404(a); the state law where the action was originally commenced
controlled.' Relying on Van Dusen, the court reasoned that since
a transfer under section 1404(a) represents only a change in courtrooms, for the convenience of litigants and witnesses, a transfer
should not affect the state law governing the action. 09 The Sixth
Circuit Court then cited its decision 10 years prior in Carson stating: "While some authorities, including one in this court, have emphasized the importance of the party seeking the transfer, we believe the more appropriate emphasis is on the nature of the
transfer. ' 1 o
In Ferens v Deere, the Supreme Court dissected Van Dusen to
decide the choice of law issue.'' Van Dusen held that the law applicable to a diversity case does not change upon a defendant-initi101. Id. The motion was made under 28 USC section 1404(a) and section 1406(a). Id
at 916. See notes 9 and 107.
102. Id at 916-17.
103. Id at 916.
104. Id at 918.
105. 623 F2d 469 (6th Cir 1980).
106. Id at 470. Plaintiff resided in Virginia; the accident occurred in Kentucky, where
defendant resided.
107. Id. 28 USC section 1406(a) provides: "The district court of a district in which is
filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the
interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought." Id.
108. Martin, 623 F2d at 473.
109. Id at 472.
110. Id.
111. Ferens, 110 S Ct at 1280-84. The Court relied exclusively on Van Dusen as its
focal point in reaching its decision. Id.
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ated transfer. 1 '2 Justice Kennedy turned to Ferens' first argument
that a transfer under section 1404(a) should not deprive parties of
1' 3
state law advantages.
That state law advantages should be preserved has it's foundation in Erie R. Co. v Tompkins." 4 In Van Dusen, it was held that
in order to allow the transfer, as well as preserve the plaintiff's
state law advantage, choice of law rules did not change following a
defendant-initiated transfer.' 5 Applying the transferor law to
plaintiff-initiated transfers will also not deprive the plaintiff of any
state law advantages." 6 Since the same law would have applied
were there no transfer, a defendant will lose no legal advantage if
the transferor law controls.' 7 Justice Kennedy reasoned that if the
transferee law applied, Erie would be undermined since a transfer
would change the state law applicable to a diversity case." 8
Justice Kennedy continued by quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v
York: ". . . for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a
non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a
block away should not lead to a substantially-different result.""' 9
But the holding of Ferens deviates from this premise. Suppose
two different plaintiffs had sued Deere based on the same transaction. One sued in Mississippi federal court with a transfer to Pennsylvania; the other sued in Pennsylvania state court. The first
party would proceed on the merits in the Pennsylvania federal
court while the other party would be barred. Although the state
and federal courts are only a block away, the accident of diversity
of citizenship 2 ° would lead to a substantially different result. This
contradicts Erie principles regarding constitutional limitations on
federal power, as well as the restraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 2 '
This argument is overcome, however, by looking at the transfer
as if the transferor forum were really being moved for sake of convenience to the transferee forum. The identity to be maintained is
between the federal court deciding the case and the courts of the
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id at 1280.
Id.
Cited in note 34.
Ferens, 110 S Ct at 1280.
Id.
Id.
Id at 1281.
Guaranty Trust Co. v York, 326 US 99, 109 (1945).
Guaranty Trust, 326 US at 109.
See brief for respondent at 24.
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state where the action was filed.'2 2 In Ferens' case, the Mississippi
federal court is theoretically moved to the Pennsylvania federal
court, and the comparison is made with the Mississippi state
courts, as opposed to the Pennsylvania state courts. The dissent
believed, however, that the principle of uniformity within a state
that underlies Klaxon was being violated. 2 3
The second reason analyzed was Ferens' argument that this was
permissible forum shopping. 2 4 Van Dusen requires that section
1404(a) not create an opportunity to obtain more favorable law by
selecting a forum through a transfer of venue.' 2 5 A plaintiff, however, already has the option of shopping for a forum with the most
favorable law, so long as the forum could assert jurisdiction over
the parties. 26 Therefore, section 1404(a) does not create opportunities for forum shopping by a plaintiff."2 7
Justice Scalia, in dissenting, said the goal of Erie was to prevent
forum shopping between state and federal systems. 2 8 According to
Justice Scalia, the application of the transferor law would encourage forum shopping between state and federal courts in the
same jurisdiction on the basis of different substantive law. This
application, moreover, would violate the principle of uniformity
within a state'2 9 in that it would bear upon the plaintiff's choice
between a state and federal forum. 3 '
While Justice Scalia's argument is sound, it is not adopted by
the majority. The majority, recognizing that a plaintiff already has
the option of shopping for a forum with the most favorable law,
reasoned that applying the transferor law would not give a plaintiff
an opportunity to use a transfer to obtain 3aa law that he could not
obtain through his initial forum selection.'
122. Van Dusen, 376 US at 639. Prior to Van Dusen, the Supreme Court held that
federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases are to apply the laws of the state in which
they sit. Griffin v McCoach, 313 US 498 (1941). (Emphasis added.)
123. Ferens, 110 S Ct 1286.
124. Id at 1281.
125. Id. (Emphasis added.)
126. Id. In Keeton v Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 US 770 (1984), a New York resident
sued an Ohio corporation in New Hampshire federal court with jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. In determining the minimum contacts required to assert jurisdiction, the
Court stated there was no requirement for a plaintiff to have minimum contacts with the
forum state in order to permit that state to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
Keeton, 465 US at 774.
127. Ferens, 110 S Ct at 1282.
128. Id at 1285.
129. Klaxon, 313 US at 496.
130. Ferens, 110 S Ct at 1285.
131. Id at 1284.
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The third reason analyzed from the Van Dusen rationale, and
the best reason from a reading of section 1404, subsection (a), was
that the decision to transfer should be based on convenience, as
opposed to prejudice flowing from a change in the applicable
law. "3' 2 If the law changed following a plaintiff-initiated transfer, a
court would be reluctant to grant a transfer where the transfer
would prejudice the defendant, despite considerations of convenience. 13 Therefore, the transferor law should apply when the
plaintiff initiates a transfer. 1 4 But Justice Scalia, in dissenting, attacked this reasoning since it assumes that the plaintiff has
brought a suit in a less convenient forum, where the law is less
135
favorable to him. Such a situation is unlikely to occur.
Justice Kennedy argued that a section 1404(a) transfer should
be based on convenience as opposed to prejudice to the defendant.1 36 To assure no prejudice resulted from a change in law, the
transferor law should continue to apply.137 But Justice Scalia argued that a defendant cannot be disadvantaged by a plaintiff-initiated transfer since the plaintiff could have brought suit in the
"plaintiff's-law forum" in the first place.' 31 While both arguments
are valid, the purpose of section 1404(a) is to transfer for convenience.' 3 9 Viewing the Mississippi court as simply being moved to
Pennsylvania for the sake of convenience focuses on this purpose.
By focusing on the purpose of section 1404(a), the majority followed the congressional intent behind the section.
The fourth reason, not discernible in the parties' briefs or from
Van Dusen, was that foresight and judicial economy favor the simple rule that the law does not change following a transfer under
section 1404(a). 40 Applying the transferee law would leave unclear
the law to be applied when either both parties move for transfer,
or a court transfers on its own initiative.' 4 To preclude litigation
and uncertainty, Justice Kennedy concluded the transferor law
14 2
should apply regardless of who makes a section 1404(a) motion.
132.
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Id at 1282. See note 9.
Id (citing Van Dusen, 376 US at 636).
Id.
Id at 1286.
Id at 1283.
Id.
Id at 1286-87.
See note 81.
Id at 1283.
Id.
Id.

1990

Recent Decisions

Justice Scalia, in his dissent, argued that it is unlikely that Congress meant to provide a plaintiff with a vehicle to appropriate the
law of a distant forum and carry it back to the state where he intends to try the case. 4 3 In addition, he argued that application of
the transferor law would encourage forum shopping between federal and state courts in the same jurisdiction onthe basis of different substantive law."' Therefore, "the principle of uniformity
within a state"' 4 5 would be compromised insofar as it related to
plaintiff's choice between a state and a federal forum. 4 '
47
Justice Scalia framed the issue differently than the majority.
He reasoned that the Rules of Decision Act was the major premise
and the issue was whether section 1404(a) alters the principle of
uniformity within a state which Klaxon says the Act embodies. 48
On the other hand, the majority began with section 1404(a) and
raised the issue whether Klaxon stands in the way of the policies
of section 1404(a). 4 9 Justice Scalia preferred his framing of the issue since the Rules of Decision Act addresses the specific subject of
which law to apply, while section 1404(a) does not.'
Although the twin aims of Erie'5 ' would appear to be violated at
first glance, the argument that the forum shopping choice already
existed prior to the transfer, and the argument that it is really a
Mississippi federal court sitting in Pennsylvania, keep the twin
aims of Erie intact. To quote Klaxon: "Whatever lack of uniformity [Erie] may produce between federal courts in different states is
attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within
the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local
policies diverging from those of it's [sic] neighbors." ' 52
The United States Supreme Court in Ferens v Deere held that
28 USC section 1404(a) did not change the applicable law following
a plaintiff initiated transfer. Courts generally apply judicial restraint by only deciding questions which are before it on certiorari.
However, the Court felt it had a duty to consider whether the deci143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id at 1286.
Id.
Id at 1286 (citing Klaxon, 313 US at 496).
Ferens, 110 S Ct at 1286.
Id at 1285.
Id.
Id at 1288.
Id.
See note 45.
Klaxon, 313 US at 496.
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sion would create litigation and uncertainty.' 5 3 The Court's foresight and judicial economy considerations' 5 unleashed all restraint. In holding additionally that the transferor law always
applies, the Court fashioned a simple rule so as to preclude the
confusion which had manifested itself since the decision in Van
Dusen concerning transfers other than defendant-initiated transfers. This decision appears on its face as one which has settled the
question of which law to apply following any section 1404(a) transfer, albeit by a 5-4 decision. Based on the Supreme Court's holding
in Ferens v Deere, any future transfer under section 1404(a) will
always carry with it the transferor law. 15
Perhaps the best perspective concerning Ferens v Deere was the
dissent of Justice Seitz of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. He
reasoned that this case involved skillful lawyering as opposed to
forum shopping and that the issue as to whether there should be
restrictions on plaintiff-initiated transfers under section 1404(a) is
an issue best left to Congress. 5 6
George S. Hickmann

153. Ferens, 110 S Ct 1288.
154. See note 58.
155. Id at 4337. Interpreting the Court's considerations of foresight and judicial economy as applying to all motions made under section 1404(a), it is easy to conclude that the
transferor law will always apply. Id.
156. Ferens, 819 F2d at 428-29.

